Abstract. This paper introduces a newly developed private key cryptosystem and a public key cryptosystem. In the first one, each letter is encrypted with a different key. Therefore, it is a kind of a one-time pad. The second one is inspired by the ElGamal cryptosystem. Both presented cryptosystems are based on automorphisms of free groups. Given a free group F of finite rank, the automorphism group Aut(F ) can be generated by Nielsen transformations, which are the basis of a linear technique to study free groups and general infinite groups. Therefore Nielsen transformations are introduced.
Introduction
The topic of this paper is established in the area of mathematical cryptology, more precisely in group based cryptology. We refer to the books [1] , [7] and [13] for the interested reader. The books [1] and [7] can also be used for a first access to the wide area of cryptology.
We introduce two cryptosystems, the first one is a private key cryptosystem (one-time pad) and the second one is a public key cryptosystem. We require that the reader is familiar with the general concept of these types of protocols. In cryptology it is common to call the two parties who want to communicate privately with each other Alice and Bob. Throughout the paper let F always be a free group F = X | of finite rank. Both cryptosystems are based on free groups F of finite rank and automorphisms of F . It is known that the group of all automorphisms of F , Aut(F ), can be generated by Nielsen transformations (see [3] ).
We first review some basic definitions concerning regular Nielsen transformations and Nielsen reduced sets and we give additional information which is also important for the understanding of the paper. Both cryptosystems use automorphisms of a free group F of finite rank. Thus, a random choice of these automorphisms is practical. An approach for this random choice using the Whitehead-Automorphisms is given. Therefore, the Whitehead-Automorphisms are reviewed. Note, that the Whitehead-Automorphisms generate the Nielsen transformations and vice versa, but the use of the Whitehead-Automorphisms is more practical if a random choice of automorphisms is required. After this, a private key cryptosystem using Nielsen transformations and Nielsen reduced sets is introduced. An example and a security analysis for this private key cryptosystem is given. Finally we explain a public key cryptosystem which is inspired by the ElGamal cryptosystem, from which we describe two variations and give an example.
The new cryptographic protocols are in part in the dissertation [12] of A. Moldenhauer under her supervisor G. Rosenberger at the University of Hamburg.
Preliminaries for Automorphisms of Free Groups
We now review some basic definitions concerning regular Nielsen transformations and Nielsen reduced sets and we give additional information which will be used later on (see also [3] , [9] or [10] ).
Let F be a free group on the free generating set X := {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x q } and let U := {u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u t } ⊂ F , q, t ≥ 2. A freely reduced word in X is a word in which the symbols x ǫ i , x −ǫ i , for ǫ = ±1 and i = 1, 2, . . . , q, do not occur consecutively. We call q the rank of F . The free generating set X is also called a basis of F . The elements u i are freely reduced words with letters in X ±1 := X ∪ X −1 , with X −1 := {x 
Here |v| denotes the free length of v ∈ F , that is, the number of letters from X ±1 in the freely reduced word v.
Remark 1.
We say that any word w with finitely many letters from X ±1 has length L if the number of letters occurring is L. The length of a word w is greater than or equal to the free length of the word w. For freely reduced words the length and the free length are equal. If a word w is not freely reduced then the length is greater than the free length of w. 
, with free generating set V = {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v N }, v i words in X, then there exist only finitely many Nielsen reduced sets U i = {u i1 , u i2 , . . . , u iN }, i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ, to V , which are Nielsen-equivalent. With the help of a lexicographical order < lex (see for instance [3 For the next lemma we need some notations. Let w = 1 be a freely reduced word in X. The initial segment s of w which is "a little more than half" of w (that is, 1 2 |w| < |s| ≤ 1 2 |w| + 1) is called the major initial segment of w. The minor initial segment of w is that initial segment s ′ which is "a little less than half" of w (that is, 
1. more than
2. more than
Theorem 2. [2]
If P (q, k) is the number of primitive elements of free length k of the free group
For n ∈ N let Z n := Z /nZ be the ring of integers modulo n. The corresponding residue class in Z n for an integer β is denoted by β (see also [1] ).
Definition 5. [1]
Let n ∈ N and β, γ ∈ Z n . A bijective mapping h : Z n → Z n given by x → βx+ γ is called a linear congruence generator.
m , m ≥ 1 and let β, γ ∈ Z such that h : Z n → Z n , with x → βx + γ, is a linear congruence generator. Further let α ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1} be given and 
Theorem 4. [8]
Let F be a free group with countable number of generators x 1 , x 2 , . . .. Corresponding to x j define
with r j ∈ Q and
Then G* generated by {M 1 , M 2 , . . .} is isomorphic to F .
The Random Choice of the Automorphisms of Aut(F )
Let F = X | be the free group on the free generating set X with |X| = q. The cryptosystems we develop are based on automorphisms of F . These automorphisms should be chosen randomly. It is known, see Proposition 3, that the Nielsen transformations generate the automorphism group Aut(F ). For a realization of a random choice procedure the Whitehead-Automorphisms will be used.
A fixed set of randomly chosen automorphisms is part of the key space for the private key cryptosystem.
Definition 6. Whitehead-Automorphisms:
Invert the letter a and leave all other letters invariant:
There are q Whitehead-Automorphisms of this type.
Let a ∈ X and L, R, M be three pairwise disjoint subsets of
There are q · 4 q−1 automorphisms of this type.
With this definition it is clear how the Whitehead-Automorphisms can be generated as a product of regular Nielsen transformations. Conversely, the Whitehead-Automorphisms generate the group of the Nielsen transformations and therefore also the automorphism group Aut(F ) (see also [4] ). With the Whitehead-Automorphisms it is simple to realize a random choice of automorphisms. We now give an approach for this choice.
An approach for choosing randomly automorphisms of Aut(F ):
Let X = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x q } be the free generating set for the free group F .
1. First of all it should be decided in which order an automorphism f i is generated by automorphisms of type i a and W (a,L,R,M) . For this purpose an automorphism of type i a is identified with a zero and W (a,L,R,M) with a one. A sequence of zeros and ones is randomly generated. This sequence is translated to randomly chosen Whitehead-Automorphisms and hence presents an automorphism f i ∈ Aut(F ). This translation is as follows: 2.1. For a zero in the sequence we generate i a randomly: choose a random number z, with 1 ≤ z ≤ q; hence an element a ∈ X must be chosen to declare the automorphism. Then it is a := x z and hence x z is replaced by x −1 z and all other letters are invariant. 2.2. For a one in the sequence we generate W (a,L,R,M) randomly: choose a random number z, with 1 ≤ z ≤ q. Hence it is a := x z . Moreover it is a ∈ M . After this the disjoint sets L, R, M ⊂ X are chosen randomly. One possible approach is the following: (a) Choose random numbers z 1 , z 2 and z 3 with
If we are in the situation of z 1 = z 2 = z 3 = 0 we get the identity id X . If this case arises a random numberz from the set {1, 2, . . . , q} \ {z} is chosen and hence the element xz is assigned randomly to one of the sets L, R or M ; therefore the identity is avoided.
It is
(b) Choose z 1 pairwise different random numbers {r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r z1 } of the set {1, 2, . . . , q} \ {z}. Then L is the set
Remark 4. If Alice and Bob use Whitehead-Automorphisms to generate automorphisms on a free group with free generating set X they should take care, that there are no sequences of the form
for the automorphism f j . They also should not use Whitehead-Automorphisms sequences for f j , which cancel each other and so be vacuous for the encryption.
4 Private Key Cryptosystem Based on Automorphisms of Free Groups F Before Alice and Bob are able to communicate with each other, they have to make some arrangements.
Public Parameters
They first agree on the public parameters.
1. A free group F with free generating set X = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x q }, with q ≥ 2.
A plaintext alphabet
It is f i : F → F and the f i , i = 1, 2, . . . , 2 128 , pairwise different, are generated with the help of 0-1-sequences (of different length) and random numbers as described in Section 3. The set F aut is part of the key space. 
Private Parameters
Now they agree on the private parameters.
1. A free subgroup F U of F with rank N and the free generating set U = {u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u N } is chosen where U is a minimal Nielsen reduced set (with respect to a lexicographical order) and the u i freely reduced words in X. Such systems U are easily to construct using Theorem 1 and Lemma 1 (see also [3] and [9] ). It is U N red the set of all minimal Nielsen reduced sets with N elements in F , which is part of the key space. 2. They use a one to one correspondence A → U a j → u j for j = 1, . . . , N.
3. Alice and Bob agree on an automorphism f α ∈ F Aut , hence α is the common secret starting point α ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2 128 − 1}, with x 1 = α ∈ Z 2 128 , for the linear congruence generator. With this α they are able to generate the sequence of automorphisms of the set F aut , which they use for encryption and decryption, respectively.
The key space: The set U N red of all minimal (with respect to a lexicographical order) Nielsen reduced subsets of F with N elements. The set F Aut of 2 128 randomly chosen automorphisms of F .
Protocol
Now we explain the protocol and look carefully at the steps for Alice and Bob.
Public knowledge: F = X | , X = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x q } with q ≥ 2; plaintext alphabet A = {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a N } with N ≥ 2; the set F Aut ; a linear congruence generator h.
Encryption and Decryption Procedure:
1. Alice and Bob agree privately on a set U ∈ U N red and an automorphism f α ∈ F Aut . They also know the one to one correspondence between U and A.
Alice wants to transmit the message
with s i ∈ A to Bob. 2.1. Alice generates with the linear congruence generator h and the knowledge of f α the z automorphisms f x1 , f x2 , . . . , f xz , which she needs for encryption.
The encryption is as follows
Recall that the one to one correspondence A → U with a j → u j , for j = 1, 2, . . . , N , holds. The ciphertext
is sent to Bob. We call c j the ciphertext units. We do no cancellations between c i and c i+1 , for 1 ≤ i ≤ z − 1.
Bob gets the ciphertext
and the information that he has to use z automorphisms of F from the set F Aut for decryption. He has now two possibilities for decryption. 3.1.a. With the knowledge of f α , the linear congruence generator h and the number z, he computes for each automorphism f xi , i = 1, 2, . . . , z, the inverse automorphism f −1 xi . 3.1.b. With the knowledge of f α , the set U = {u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u N }, the linear congruence generator h and the number z, he computes for each automorphism f xi , i = 1, 2, . . . , z, the set
Hence, with the one to one correspondence between U and A, he gets a one to one correspondence between the letters in the alphabet A and the words of the ciphertext depending on the automorphisms f xi . This is shown in Table 1 . Table 1 . Plaintext alphabet A = {a1, a2, . . . , aN } corresponded to ciphertext alphabet U fx i depending on the automorphisms fx i
3.2. With the knowledge of the Table 1 or the inverse automorphisms f −1 xi , respectively, the decryption is as follows
He generates the plaintext message
with s i ∈ A, from Alice.
Remark 6.
The cryptosystem is a polyalphabetic system. A word u i ∈ U , and hence a letter a i ∈ A, is encrypted differently at different places in the plaintext. Example 1. This example was executed with the help of the computer program GAP and the package "FGA 2 ". First Alice and Bob agree on the public parameters.
1. Let F be the free group on the free generating set X = {a, b, c, d}. x → 5x + 3.
The private parameters for this example are:
1. The free group FŨ of F with the free generating set
It is known, that a i → u i , i = 1, 2, . . . , 12, for u i ∈Ũ and a i ∈Ã. The set U is a Nielsen reduced set and the group FŨ has rank 12. Alice and Bob agree on the starting automorphism f 93 , hence it is x 1 = α = 93.
We look at the encryption and decryption procedure for Alice and Bob.
2. With the above agreements Alice is able to encrypt her message
Her message is of length 8. She generates the ciphertext as follows: 2.1. She first determines, with the help of the linear congruence generator h, the automorphisms f xi , i = 1, 2, . . . , 8, which she needs for encryption. It is
The automorphisms are described with the help of regular Nielsen transformations, it is
Note, that the regular Nielsen transformations are applied from the left to the right.
The ciphertext is now
The symbol " ≀" marks the end of a ciphertext unit c i . 3. Bob gets the ciphertext
Alice. Now he knows, that he needs eight automorphisms for decryption. 3.1. Bob knows the set U , the linear congruence generator h and the starting seed automorphism f 93 . For decryption he uses tables (analogously to Table 1 ). Now, he is able to compute for each automorphism f xi the set U fx i , i = 1, 2, . . . , 8, and to generate the tables Table 2, Table 3 , Table 4 and Table 5 . Table 2 . Correspondence: plaintext alphabet to ciphertext alphabet I Table 4 . Correspondence: plaintext alphabet to ciphertext alphabet III
3.2. With these tables he is able to generate the plaintext from Alice, it is
Security
This private key cryptosystem is secure against chosen plaintext attacks and chosen ciphertext attacks. In a chosen plaintext attack, an attacker, Eve, chooses an arbitrary plaintext of her choice and gets the corresponding ciphertext. In a chosen ciphertext attack Eve sees ciphertexts and gets to some of these ciphertexts the corresponding plaintexts (see also [1] ).
An eavesdropper, Eve, intercepts the ciphertext
with c i = f xi (u j ) for some 1 ≤ j ≤ N . If Alice and Bob choose non characteristic subgroups, then it is likely that c j / ∈ F U for some 1 ≤ j ≤ z. Hence the ciphertext units give no hint for the subgroup F U . Eve knows L = z k=1 |c k |, the length of C, because Alice and Bob are doing no cancellations between c i and c i+1 , for 1 ≤ i ≤ z − 1.
To break the system Eve needs to know the set U . For this it is likely that she assumes that the ball B(F, L) in the Cayleygraph for F contains a basis for F U . With this assumption she searches for primitive elements for F U in the ball B(F, L), |y| ≤ L, y ∈ F . In fact she needs to find N primitive elements for F U in B(F, L) (these would be primitive elements for F U in a ball B(F U , L) for some Nielsen reduced basis for F U ). From Proposition 4 and Theorem 2 it is known that the number of primitive elements grows exponentially with the free length of the elements. Eve chooses sets M i := {m i1 , m i2 , . . . , m iK } with K ≥ N and elements m ij in B(F, L) and with Nielsen transformations she constructs the corresponding Nielsen reduced sets
The number N is a constant in the cryptosystem, hence it takes O(λ 2 ) time, with λ := max{|m j ℓ | | ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , K} ≤ L, to get the set M ′ j from M j with the algorithm [16] (see Remark 3).
The main security certification depends on the fact, that for a single subset of K elements Eve finds a Nielsen reduced set in polynomial running time (more precisely in quadratic time) but she has to test all possible subsets of K elements for which she needs exponential running time.
The security certification can be improved by the next two improvements.
First, Alice and Bob choose in addition an explicit presentation of the ciphertext units c i as matrices in SL(2, Q). So, they agree on a faithful representation ϕ : F → SL(2, Q) 4) . The group G = ϕ(F ) is isomorphic to F under the mapping x i → M i , for i = 1, . . . , q. The ciphertext is now
a sequence of matrices W j ∈ SL(2, Q). The encryption is realizable with a table (as Table 1 ) if the representation ϕ is applied to the elements in the table. Therefore Bob gets a table with matrices and hence an assignment from the matrices to the plaintext alphabet depending on the automorphisms f xi .
Here the additional security certification is, that there is no algorithm known to solve the membership problem (see for instance [10] ) for subgroups of SL(2, Q) which are not subgroups in SL(2, Z). B. Eick, M. Kirschner and C. Leedham-Green presented in the paper [5] a practical algorithm to solve the constructive membership problem for discrete free subgroups of rank 2 of SL(2, R). For example, the subgroup SL(2, Z) of SL(2, R) is discrete. But they also mention, that it is an open problem to solve the membership problem for arbitrary subgroups of SL(2, R) with rank m ≥ 2. Alice and Bob work with subgroups of rank N ≥ 2. Hence there is in general no algorithm known for Eve to solve the membership problem, in particular there is always no such algorithm known for N ≥ 3. These matrices form a basis for a free group G of rank 3. Alice and Bob generate a subgroup G 1 of G with rank 4. The free generating set for
The ciphertext is now Instead of a sequence of words in F Alice sends to Bob a sequence of eight matrices in SL(2, Q).
For the second improvement Alice and Bob use instead of a presentation of the ciphertext in SL(2, Q) a presentation of the ciphertext in a free group in GL(2, k) with k := Z[y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y w ], the ring of polynomials in variables y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y w . With the help of a homomorphism ǫ * : GL(2, k) → GL(2, Z) and the knowledge of an algorithm to write each element in the modular group PSL(2, Z), the group of 2 × 2 projective integral matrices of determinant 1, in terms of s and t they can reconstruct the message. Here, and PSL(2, Z) = s, t | s 2 = (st) 3 = 1 . Every finitely generated free group is faithfully represented by a subgroup of the modular group PSL(2, Z). Especially, the two matrices generate a free group of rank two, and this free group certainly contains finitely generated free groups.
This improvement is very similar to the version in [1] . Here, the security certification depends in addition on the unsolvability of Hilbert's Tenth Problem. Y. Matiyasevich proved in [11] that there is no general algorithm which determines whether or not an integral polynomial in any number of variables has a zero.
His message for Alice is m = x −2
x
In comparison to the standard cryptosystems which are mostly based on number theory we explained two cryptosystems which use combinatorial group theory. The first cryptosystem in Section 4 is a one-time pad, which choice of the random sequence for encryption is not number-theoretic. At the moment it is costlier than the standard systems but it is another option for a one-time pad which is based on combinatorial group theory and not on number theory. The second cryptosystem in Section 5 is similar to the ElGamal cryptosystem (see [6] ), which is easier to handle. The ElGamal cryptosystem is based on the discrete logarithm problem over a finite field. If this problem should eventually be solved we introduced here an alternative system, which is not based on number theory.
